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Crux et Vocatio 
 
Introduction 
 
Martin Luther is often invoked in support of a theology of the cross.  This is not surprising, given 
his frequent appeals to the cross as the font of theological reflection.  Yet there is a undeniable 
infelicity in Luther’s name being attached to certain formulations of a theology of the cross.  
This is particularly evident in those instances in which a theology of the cross becomes a 
theological method which occasions a self certain appraisal of theological truth.1  When a 
theology of the cross, in abstraction from its narration,  becomes an epistemological guarantor, 
the cross itself has suffered an injurious shame.  This occurs most frequently when the cross 
becomes a cypher for existential anxiety and, as such, the cross becomes a singular instance of a 
general affirmation of suffering as the locus of God’s activity.  The cross can and does 
meaningfully refer to both anxiety and suffering, in general, but as this article will argue, it does 
so precisely because it is first a concrete event in the life of Jesus of Nazareth and second 
because it is concretized in the life of the faithful wherein it engages the public as well as the 
private. 
 This article will advance by first exploring Luther’s explication of a theology of the cross 
in his Heidelberg Disputation.  I will underscore the Disputation as a pedagogical tool, which 
forms readers into theologians of the cross.  The Disputation, then, is not intended to outline a 
 
 1  Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, German Eds.  Martin Kuske and Ilse Tödt, Eds. 
Geffrey Kelly and John D. Godsey, Trs. Barbara Green and Reinhard Krauss (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1996), p. 43: ‘Cheap grace means grace as a doctrine, as principle, as system.  It 
means the forgiveness of sin as a general truth; it means God’s love as merely a Christian idea of 
God.’ 
 2 
method so much as to lead its reader into an encounter with God in Christ.2  Theologians of the 
cross, then, are born by grace through faith into that reign of God from which they are able to 
construe the significance of the cross for justified life.  I next underscore that Luther understands 
the cross as concretized in vocatio, that means by which the Christian lives in God’s two reigns 
of church and world and through which the Christian is cruciformed.  In conclusion, I explore 
the resources inherent in Luther’s treatment of crux et vocatio for a life of responsio, both to the 
gracious elicitation of new life in Christ and its corresponding vocational engagement in a world 
obsessed with fadish novelty and oblivious to the renewal of faith. 
 
Crux 
 
The Heidelberg Disputation contains Luther’s clearest articulation of a theology of the cross. 
In this document, Luther writes with a specific purpose in mind, that is, to make theologians of 
glory into theologians of the cross.3   Luther progresses in this goal by way of careful rhetorical 
movements.4 At its best, theology does not advance by way of deduction from arid principles, 
but by a lively engagement between dialogue partners.  Anyone who has read Luther recognizes 
 
 2  Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transendental Philosophy and Ontology in 
Systematic Theology, German Ed.  Hans-Richard Reuter, Ed. Wayne Whitson Floyd, Jr., Tr. H. 
Martine Rumscheidt  (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), p. 131: ‘Here, not in its method of 
thinking, but rather in the obedience of thinking, the scholarly discipline of theology does differ 
fundamentally from everything profane.’ 
 3  Gerhard O. Forde, On Being a Theologian of the Cross: Reflections on Luther’s 
Heidelberg Disputation, 1518 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1997), p. 60. 
 4  David S. Cunningham has demonstrates that, theology is, above all else, a task in 
faithful persuasion.  Cf. Faithful Persuasion: In Aid of a Rhetoric of Christian Theology (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 15, 37. 
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in him a rhetor whose aim is not to impart data, but to persuade his or her partner to action.5  
David S. Yeago has described Luther as ‘a supremely rhetorical theologian,’ who writes ‘to 
move and form consciences, to call forth and nurture faith, hope and love, and to defend the little 
flock of the faithful against the crafts and assaults of the Tempter.’6  In light of this, we can 
expect that a document which evolved in the context of a theological debate concerning Luther’s 
new insights, is a carefully crafted piece of rhetoric.   
 The Heidelberg Disputation arose in response to a request by Johann von Staupitz 
(Luther’s supervisor in the German order of the Augustinians) that Luther participate in a 
disputation with the Augustinians at Heidelberg on April 26th, 1518.  Luther was asked to 
prepare theses on the topic of sin, free will, and grace in order to aquaint his fellow Augustinians 
with his new and controversial theology.  The Disputation consists of 28 theses on theological 
and 12 theses on philosophical topics, as well as proofs for the theological topics and a longer 
explication of the theme of grace and the will.  Although Luther failed to convince his seniors, 
his theses were well received by younger theologians, among whom were those involved in 
spreading the Reformation.7   
 In examining The Heidelberg Disputation, the reader discovers a carefully crafted 
document that aims towards the transformation of the reader by drawing her into a series of 
arguments that destroy all foundations for a claim of righteousness outside of the presence of 
Christ who transforms the faithful.  As Forde has discerned, the Disputation has four key 
 
 5  Cunningham, Faithful Persuasion, p. 76. 
 6  David S. Yeago,  ‘Ecclesia Sancta, Ecclesia Peccatrix’ in Pro Ecclesia IX. No. 3 
(Summer, 2000): pp. 331, 332. 
 7  LW-31, pp. 37, 38 from Martin Luther, Luther’s Works (Saint Louis and Philadelphia: 
Concordia and Fortress, 1958-86). 
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movements.  Luther discusses, in turn, good works, the will, a theology of the cross in contrast 
with a theology of glory, and finally the righteousness of faith.  Piece by piece, Luther 
dismantles any claim for self sufficiency.  Using St. Paul and St. Augustine, but also carefully 
constructed logic and rhetorical flourish, Luther demonstrates throughout the Disputation, that 
humans have no claim to righteousness on their own.  I will, at this point, elucidate some key 
features of Luther’s argument in this document as a way to clarify Luther’s understanding of a 
theology of the cross. 
 Luther discusses the problem of works in the first twelve theses.  From the outset, Luther 
crafts the issue of works in relationship to the laws of God.  The first two theses demonstrate that 
if the law, given by God for our good, fails to enable us to do truly good works, how much less 
can we trust in our own ability in abstraction from God’s given laws.  Luther then proceeds to 
use a series of arguments to provide the reader with a view of works from a slightly different 
perspective.  He notes that, in the Bible, the saints themselves plead for mercy, which denies his 
hearer the certitude by which to affirm her work as good and that seemingly good works can be 
mortal sins insofar as an outer good work need not correspond with a pure heart, the very 
concern of God.  In so doing, Luther deprives his hearers of the relief of appealing to venial sins, 
since he asserts, in citing Galatians 3:10, that the sins with which we have to do are mortal 
insofar as we fail in keeping the law of God, with its unconditional demand.  Our inability to 
know whether, in fact, we have really succeeded in keeping the law places us in the situation in 
which we know not whether our works, which are seemingly good, are in fact truly good.  This 
curious state of affairs parallels the realization that the works of God, which all too often are far 
from attractive, are altogether righteous by virtue of their being God’s works.  How things 
appear need not reflect the state of affairs.  In fact, Luther completely turns a popular notion of 
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mortal and venial sins on its head by redefining all sins as mortal, yet admitting the possibility 
that fearing a sin as mortal is the very condition for its being regarded as venial.  It is interesting 
to note throughout the first twelve theses, that deal with the question of good works, how often 
Luther makes us of ‘how things seem’ and ‘how it appears.’  He aims to provide us with a 
different vantage point from which to apprehend the notion of good works.  He aims to locate 
our vantage point in Christ. 
 Luther continues his rhetorical strategy by next addressing the issue of the will in theses 
13 through 18.  Free will, as is made clear in the Bondage of the Will, is a divine name.8  This 
does not preclude the possibility of speaking of a free will in connection with the human, yet 
Luther does so in a thoroughly paradoxical manner.  Luther looks at the human as existing the 
mode of patient and agent.  Insofar as the human engages the will in the mode of an agent, she 
fails to act freely, and only succeeds to do evil.  It is possible, however, after the Fall, for the free 
will to ‘do’ good in the mode of patience, or suffering.9  Here the human will works well by first 
being worked through (a theme further treated in the final section of the Disputation).  In effect, 
Luther has first deprived his hearer of any self confidence in their ability to do good works, and 
then of their ability to will well.  He aims to drive his audience to a point of desperation, the very 
condition necessary for the reception of grace. 
 The next stage, theses 19 through 24 address what Forde calls ‘the great divide’: a 
theology of the cross in contrast to a theology of glory.10  In a fashion, this next stage in the 
 
 8  LW-33, p. 68. 
 9  LW-31, p. 49.  Cf. WA-1, p. 360: ‘Liberum arbitrium post peccatum in bonum potentia 
subiectiva, in malum vero semper activa.’ 
 10  Forde, Theologian of the Cross, p. 69. 
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Disputation is jarring, and perhaps a little bit unexpected.  Luther has first deprived his hearer of 
the comfort of good works, then of the surety of a well ordered will in order to prepare his hearer 
to receive the grace of Christ.  One would expect the next section to give an account of the 
indwelling righteousness of Christ, that is grace, and thereby to fulfill von Staupitz’s request to 
address the topics of sin, free will and grace.  Luther, instead, carves an opening between the 
treatment of the will and his treatment of the indwelling of grace in theses 25 through 28.  His 
text ‘makes space’ for a treatment of the character of a theologian, here dealt with under the 
categories of being a theologian of glory and a theologian of the cross.  Of utmost import, in this 
moment of suspension, is the manner in which Luther invokes the experience of the reader in 
which to advance his argument.  The previous two section, concerning good works and free will, 
call into dispute how the reader normally views matters.  The reader, surprised to discover that 
good works are not so good and God’s sometimes seemingly ugly works are, in fact, exceedingly 
good realizes that she has called good what is in fact evil and evil what is, in fact, good.  In the 
third movement of the disputation, then, the reader finds a self description in Luther’s assertion 
that ‘a theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil.’11  The reader cannot help but see 
something of herself in that description.  Luther anticipates this.  All humans see their work as 
exceedingly worthy, and thereby demonstrate their identity as theologians of glory.  But this very 
identification is, for Luther, the critical step in his masterful conformation of the reader to a 
theology of the cross.  The reader is caught, as it were, in a trap.  The contrary character of 
Luther’s articulation of his theological insight in the first 19 theses is meant to evoke counter 
arguments.  At a fundamental level, the reader identifies with these counter arguments, but then 
is told that it is the mark of a theologian of glory to identify with what Luther argues against.  
 
 11  LW-31, p. 53. 
 7 
But this self identification as a theologian of glory is the very moment of transformation that 
makes her into a theologian of a cross.  There is an ‘aha’ moment written into the script of the 
Disputation.  In seeing myself as a theologian of glory, I begin to be a theologian of the cross.  
Luther advances a counter intuitive move insofar as he teases the reader into the realization that 
my self identification as a theologian of glory can only be an instance of an alien work, precisely 
because of the arresting quality of its truth.  If that which is true comes from outside of me, and if 
my self identification as a theologian of glory is true, then that very moment is itself an instance 
of grace.  The reader is being justified in the give and take of the text’s confrontation.  After 
establishing the event character of this transformation, Luther is prepared to describe what has 
just happened. 
 At the heart of the last four theses, articulating the nature of the righteousness of faith, is 
a description of the life of faith in thesis 27 and its explication: 
 
Actually one should call the work of Christ an acting work and our work an 
accomplished  work, and thus an accomplished work pleasing to God by the grace of the 
acting work.  Since Christ lives in us through faith (Quia dum Christus in nobis habitat 
per fidem) so he arouses us to do good works through that living faith in his work, for the 
works which he does are the fulfilment of the commands of God given us through faith.  
If we look at them we are moved to imitate them.12 
 
 
 12  LW-31, pp. 56, 57.  WA-1, 364 from Martin Luther, Dr. Martin Luthers Werke 
(Weimar: Böhlau, 1883-1993). 
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 Of considerable import, here, is the notion that Christ lives in us through faith.13 We see, 
then, that the condition for the possibility of our faithful patience is the agency of the indwelling 
Christ.  Justification, as an event, presupposes the presence of Christ who works in us and 
thereby moves us to imitate his fulfilment of the commands of God.  Imitation, for Luther, 
clearly follows upon our being moved (movemur).  A sort of dual agency is presumed that 
follows upon the primary agency of Christ.  My acting in imitation is only possible because 
another has first acted in me.  The reader will have just gone through this experience, and is now 
having her experience explained to her in a manner that includes an imperative nested within an 
indicative.  In Luther’s reference to imitationem, the reader is reminded of the significance of 
looking upon the works of Christ, which refer the reader to Luther’s earlier treatment of a 
theology of the cross.  In that section, Luther turned the reader from the vain posture of 
presuming to look upon the invisible things of God, to comprehending ‘the visible and manifest 
things of God seen through the cross and suffering.’14  A shift occurs insofar as the reader no 
longer attends to the invisible, but to that hidden in suffering.15  In the Disputation, then, Luther 
advances a theology of the cross by locating the reader in Christ, in whom she has a new locus 
for viewing the world. 
 
 13  And so Luther will assert that once ‘a Christian begins to know Christ as his Lord and 
Savior, through whom he is redeemed from death and brought into His dominion and 
inheritance, God completely permeates (durchgottet) his heart.’  LW-24, p. 87. 
 14  LW-31, p. 52. 
 15  Cf. Gerhard Ebeling,  Luther: An Introduction to his Thought, Tr. R.A. Wilson 
(London: Collins, 1970), p. 227.  And so, for Luther, Christ’s cry of despair on the cross 
evidences the concealment, rather than the absence of God (LW-12, 126). 
 9 
 Many have suggested that Luther’s theology of the cross as evidenced in the Disputation 
is an integrating concept throughout all of Luther’s work.16  Others see a theology of the cross as 
an emphasis of the early Luther.  David Yeago resolves this by pointing to a subordination of a 
theology of the cross into the later Luther’s sacramental theology that suggests a continuity of 
thought in its development.17  In both Luther’s theology of the cross, and sacramental theology, 
the defining element is a strategy wherein the reader is led to expect things to be different than 
they first appear and by which idolatry is foreclosed.  As Ebeling noted earlier, God under 
contrariety is a red thread throughout Luther’s thought.18  More generally, this accords with von 
Loewenlich’s characterization of revelation as indirect in the thought of Luther.19  Accordingly, 
faith itself, like the cross, is marked by concealment.  These themes deny to those, who otherwise 
mean well, the comfort of seeing the cross as means by which we can predict God’s way with 
self certainty.  The cross is not a crystal ball.  If one can discern in Luther’s treatment of the 
cross a prognostic moment it is simply this: the cross teaches us that the way of God cannot be 
presumed and theologians of the cross best be prepared for surprises.  In contrast to those 
theologies wherein a theology of the cross, in the words of Yeago, tends to ‘refer to anything 
[protestants] like’,21 the cross is never meant to comfort, at least not in a facile manner.  The 
 
 16  Walther von Loewenlich,  Luther’s Theology of the Cross, Tr. Herbert J.A. Bouman 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1976), p. 49. 
 17  David S. Yeago, ‘The Catholic Luther,’ in The Catholicity of the Reformation Eds. 
Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 
1996), p. 27. 
 18  Ebeling, Luther, p. 236. 
 19  von Loewenlich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, pp. 11, 19. 
 21  Yeago, Catholicity, p. 20. 
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cross subverts, and a theologian of the cross is attentive to the transformative experience of 
exactly that.  Moreover, it is absolutely critical, if one wishes to faithfully exposit Luther, to 
understand that his treatment of the cross cannot be extricated from a solid confidence in 
resurrection as that event which makes possible any talk at all of a theology of the cross.22  Also 
to be noted is the denial, inherent in Luther’s treatment of the cross, of the possibility of 
understanding the cross as an abstraction, or in some cases, a more general cypher for a 
willingness to live with ambiguity.  For Luther, language about the cross never refers to a 
principle, but like justification itself, to an event.23  As such, reference to a theology of the cross 
in the life of the faithful ought to be concretized in particular experiences.24  In order to advance 
our understanding of this, we turn now to vocatio, Luther’s treatment of the cross in situ.  
 
Vocatio 
 
Luther’s estimation of vocation as a doctrine points to its necessary place in that constellation of 
doctrines that articulate the theo-logic of the confession that Jesus is Lord.25  Vocation, for 
 
 22  Forde, Theologian, p. 1, note 1. 
 23  Ebeling, Luther, pp. 162-4. 
 24  Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology 
of the Church, German Ed. Joachim von Soosten, Ed., Clifford Green, Tr. Reinhard Krauss and 
Nancy Lukens (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), pp. 48, 49: ‘The person exists always and 
only in ethical responsibility; the person is recreated again and again in the perpetual flux of 
life.’ 
 25  Cf. Karlfried Froehlich,  ‘Luther on Vocation,’ in Harvesting Martin Luther’s 
Reflections on Theology, Ethics, and the Church.  Ed. Timothy J. Wengert.  (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2004), p. 121 who notes that the description of vocation as a 
doctrine is, in and of itself, a surprising appraisal. 
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Luther, is not a term reserved for clergy.  It is an all embracing term that relates to Luther’s 
understanding of both creation and preservation, as well as redemption.  Vocation is a critical 
doctrine for Luther because it serves to narrate the location of the Christian in the world and its 
consummation.  Vocation is, above all else, a consequent of the fact that Christ’s vocation was to 
embrace the world on the cross so that it might come to be what it is in the will of God.  
Vocation, for the faithful, flows from our participation in Christ’s vocation. 
 Gustaf Wingren wrote the standard treatment on Luther on vocation.26  In this seminal 
work he carefully relates vocation both to Luther’s theology of the cross and to his doctrine of 
two reigns.  In sum, vocation is the means by which God cruciforms the faithful at the 
intersection of church and world.  In order to unpack this summary, some preliminary comments 
regarding Luther’s treatment of the two reigns are first required. 
 Luther’s treatment of the two reigns is his most maligned doctrine.  Its most vehement 
critics generally aim at a caricature of the doctrine that has become determinative for a 
superficial understanding of Luther’s doctrine.  This caricature envisions that the world is 
divided into two socio-political realms, the realm of church and the realm of state.27  The 
division between these realms is sharp, and its consequent is quietism.  The realm of the state is 
the realm of law and the realm of the church is the realm of gospel.  Bonhoeffer recognized this 
caricature as operative among the German Christians and provided a stinging critique of it in his 
 
 26  Gustaf Wingren,  Luther on Vocation, Tr. Carl C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1957). 
 27  I use ‘realm’ here with its spatio-restrictive connotations in distinction from ‘reign’, 
which I reserve for Luther’s treatment proper. 
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incomplete Ethics.28  Bonhoeffer noted that the original use of the doctrine of the two reigns in 
Luther was to assert the unity of two reigns, which are church and world, not church and state, 
and which exist Miteinander, Füreinander, and Gegeneinander.29  This assertion helps us to 
understand better that the two reigns are, for Luther, coexistent in a fashion that is analogous to 
the real presence of Christ in the sacrament.  It is for this reason that Gerhard Ebeling asserted 
that the doctrine of the two reigns cannot be represented by a diagram, nor can the distinction be 
explained, but only preached.30  Gustaf Wingren narrates the theological significance of this 
doctrine by locating the Christian between the reign of world and church.31  In Wingren’s 
portrayal of Luther’s thought, the resultant tension is further multiplied by the fact that the 
Christian simultaneously lives between God and the devil.32  Whereas the simul of living under 
the aegis of God and the devil is characterized by mutual exclusion and its attendant tragedy, the 
simul of living in both reigns is the crisis of cruciformation.  This cruciformation is an event and 
the event occurs by grace of vocation.  Vocation is the place where the cross takes form.33  
 
 28  Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, German Eds. Isle Tödt, Heinz Eduard Tödt, Ernst Feil, 
and Clifford Green, Ed., Clifford J. Green, Tr. Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas 
W. Stott (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), p. 60. 
 29  Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 393.  Althaus also considers the two reigns interdependent.  Cf. 
Paul Althaus,  Die Ethik Martin Luthers   (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 
1965), pp. 64, 65. 
 30  Ebeling, Luther, p. 177. 
 31  Wingen, Luther on Vocation, p. 85. 
 32  Paul Althaus notes that for the very early Luther, the world was Satan’s province.  
Through his development of the doctrine of the two reigns, it quickly becomes apparent that 
God, not Satan is Lord of both reigns.  Cf. Althaus, Die Ethik Martin Luthers, p. 57. 
 33  Wingren, Luther on Vocation, pp. 29, 54, 66. 
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Moreover, this formation takes place at precisely the intersection of the two reigns.34  It is 
important to note that vocation for the Christian takes on a particular character by virtue of this 
location.  Insofar as the world, as well as the church, is under God’s beneficence, the reign of the 
world is gifted with order.  Humans are given a place, or Stand in life.  These Stände are the 
means by which life in the world advances.  For the Christian, however, there is conversion of 
sorts.  In Christ, my Stand becomes my Beruf.35  The blessed burden that attends living under 
order, that is ordinary life, becomes the occasion for God’s work upon us.36  As Luther states, 
when God works on us, he hews us into the shape of the cross.37  Vocatio, then, is understood 
baptismally because by our baptism, we understand our Stand differently.38  The fact that God 
works in my vocation is the very reason why vocation itself is an object of faith.39   
 In order to fully understand Luther’s treatment of vocation, it needs to be clarified how 
sharply Luther intends to contrast it with cloistered existence.  Luther writes: 
  
 When I was a monk, I wearied myself greatly for almost fifteen years with the daily 
 
 34  Wingren, Luther on Vocation, p. 28. 
 35  Wingren, Luther on Vocation, p. 2.  It is important to note that this specifically 
theological use of Beruf is lost in modern German.  Bonhoeffer (Ethics, p. 289) alerts us to this 
and provides a fresh reading of Beruf, which I will explore below.  Cf. LW-13, p. 370, where 
Luther insists that Christians alone know that their Stand is divinely ordered. 
 36  Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, 
German Eds. Martin Rüter and Isle Tödt, Ed., John W. De Gruchy, Tr. Douglas Stephen Bax 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), p. 99: ‘The other person is the limit that God sets for me, 
the limit that I love and that I will not transgress because of my love.’ 
 37  LW-13, p. 378. 
 38  LW-24, p. 220. 
 39  LW-24, p. 394. 
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 sacrifice, tortured myself with fastings, vigils, prayers, and other very rigorous works. 
 .... Even today I recall these torments, but not in such a way as to consider returning  
 to that prison.  To speak according to the flesh, it was not a prison, but a soft kind of 
 life, free from all the innumerable annoyances of civil government and domestic affairs. 
 Yet it was a prison to good men who did not think simply of their bellies but longed  
 for salvation.40 
 
 It is important to see that for Luther, vocatio is transformative precisely in the concrete 
demand it places on us as we engage in the trials and triumphs of domestic and civil affairs.  
Moreover, insofar as it is a transformative locus, it is so only by the anticipatory power of the 
resurrection, which is the supposition for the cross concretized in vocation.41  Vocation for that 
reason is located at the intersection of church and world and one attends to both law and gospel 
in vocational response.  Wingren’s reading of Luther, on that account, is close to Bonhoeffer 
who insists that both law and gospel operate in both realms.42  This is why Wingren insists that 
God works through the stations of life to save the human by first crucifying him and then giving 
him faith.  Consequently, Wingren can write that the ‘freedom of faith does not dissolve 
vocation.  On the contrary, it sustains it and gives it new life.’43   Insofar as baptism ever 
transforms me, it transforms my Stand to become my Beruf, or vocatio.  The reign of heaven 
 
 40  LW-12, p. 273.  Cf. also LW-12, pp. 71-74. 
 41  Wingren, Luther on Vocation, p. 58. 
 42   Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 357. 
 43  Wingren, Luther on Vocation, p. 66. 
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touches the reign of earth precisely in my Stand and occasions its conversion by converting me.  
Luther is not unaware of the eschatological character of this conversion: 
 
 And if I thus remain in Christ, then it is certain that for His sake my vocation, my life, 
 and my works are also acceptable to God and are precious fruits in His sight.  And  
 though I myself am still weak in the faith, and though many frailties and sinful lusts  
 still dwell within me and always manifest themselves, this will not be reckoned against 
 me but will be forgiven, provided I do not yield to them.44 
 
 The gospel is the power that revitalizes vocation in renewing me.45  For this reason, in 
Luther’s estimation, it is inadmissible to ponder the possibility of changing my station in life.46  
This is a correlate, for Luther, of the notion that we cannot chose our own cross.47  Moreover, 
this inadmissibility is of a piece with Luther’s assessment that my Stand is not only the locus for 
my cruciformation, but it is also the means by which God meets the needs of my neighbour.48   
 Luther’s assessment of the inadmissibility of changing vocations reflects a particular 
notion of the public that is no longer operative and represents one area in which there is a need to 
move beyond Luther by way of Luther.  In order to advance an alternate treatment of the public, 
 
 44  LW-24, p. 221. 
 45  Wingren, Luther on Vocation, pp. 66, 91. 
 46  LW-3, pp. 62, 216-218.  Luther will even assert that ‘Actually the pope and the 
bishops should remain in their place; only they should acknowledge this King, humbly bow 
before Him, and embrace His Word.’  LW-12, p. 74. 
 47  Althaus, Die Ethik Marin Luthers, p. 29. 
 48  Althaus, Die Ethik Marin Luthers, p. 47. 
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I will next sketch the contours of some contemporary notions of our view of both the public and 
vocation, before revisiting the question of the relationship between cross and vocation for the 
good of the lives of the faithful today. 
 
Responsio 
 
Bonhoeffer asserted that the vocatio of Christ evokes the responsio of the disciple; the Beruf of 
the disciple originates in the Ruf of Christ.49  This is a helpful clarification, insofar as it allows us 
to consider more carefully the transformative power of the call for the called in her calling.  In 
order to more carefully tease out the significance of this, I will briefly sketch out some 
contemporary understandings of both vocation and the public in which we exercise our vocation. 
After doing that, I will explore the manner in which Bonhoeffer’s treatment of the ultimate and 
penultimate can serve to advance Luther’s treatment of vocatio by way of Luther. 
 An estimation of the place of vocatio in a contemporary theology has to take into account 
the changed state of affairs.  The ancient world, in which the miller’s son would be a miller no 
longer holds.  Froehlich asserts that in modernity, we experience vocation as a self-inflected 
discipline.50  Choosing a career is an integral part of the task of self invention that has been 
placed on our shoulders.51  Moreover, this task has been laden with expectations that would have 
been unimaginable for pre-moderns.  The heritage of vocational significance that Luther gave to 
modernity as the affirmation of the ordinary has morphed into the expectation of the extra-
 
 49  Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 289. 
 50  Froehlich, Harvesting, p. 128. 
 51  Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Concord, ON: Anansi, 1991), p. 81. 
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ordinary.52  The status quo is no longer seen as acceptable or to put the matter more sharply, the 
status quo is now seen as change itself.53   The worker willing to spend his career in the same job 
is now seen as morally suspect.  Risk is the principle virtue, yet unlike risk of old, today’s risk is 
deprived of narrative support.54  The once treasured virtue of loyalty is an impossibility insofar 
as its motivation, delayed gratification, is no longer supported by stable institutions.55  The 
faithful in both pew and pulpit increasingly have no sense of the stability of their vocation.  
Society continually expects us to re-invent ourselves and thereby betrays, by its obsession with 
novelty, that ‘society’ itself is a product of modernity. 
 Hannah Arendt traces the emergence of ‘society’ as a determinative concept in the west 
in The Human Condition.56  In so doing she notes that the ancients held that the two realms of the 
private and the public referred to the realms of the family and the polis.57  The former was the 
realm of necessity, labour, and the place in which the dominus dominated slaves and family 
members.  For the ancients, the private was a sphere of deprivation.58  The realm of freedom, by 
contrast, was the polis.  Here, free men debated among one another and advanced the great 
 
 52  Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 218. 
 53  Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 
1998) p. 31. 
 54  Sennett, Corrosion, p. 83. 
 55  Sennett, Corrosion, p. 99. 
 56 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958). 
 57  Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 28. 
 58  Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 38. 
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projects of humankind.59  Part and parcel of Arendt’s description of this reality is her division of 
the human life into three principal arenas.  At the most fundamental level, humans labour for that 
which they consume (ie. food and necessities).  Humans with the freedom to advance beyond 
this level (such as artisans) work for that which can be used and endures beyond the life of the 
artisan as a reach for immorality (ie. art and use objects).  But at the highest level, the citizen acts 
in community to produce in the polis the immemorial projects of politics.   
 Arendt makes a compelling case that a radical re-ordering of the ancient hierarchy has 
taken place in modernity.  To cite two examples, ‘politics’ has become a cypher for social 
sophistry, and moderns now construct use objects that are consumed.60  But above all, the 
reversal of the ancient world’s priorities is evident in the modern estimation of the significance 
of the private.  ‘Society,’ in Arendt’s estimation, is the private writ large and the oikos is the now 
the model for economy.61  Society is run as if it were one large, but dysfunctional family, with 
economic lords competing to dominate domestic life.62  Conformism in the guise of equality 
replaces the engagement of the individual in the res publica.63  In society, the aporia of work is 
that its end becomes meaningless insofar as the res publica no longer functions to guide it.64  
Moreover, the modern attack of the public renders the private as the only possible sphere of 
meaning with the result that meaning is finally a vacuous concept.  Work no longer provides one 
 
 59  Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 12. 
 60  And so consumers buy portable phones, computers, etc. that are discarded after a time 
as if they were used up. 
 61  Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 33. 
 62  Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 39, 40. 
 63  Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 41. 
 64  Arendt, p. 154, 155. 
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with a place in the world, but a function in a society that is replaceable, contingent, and wholly 
deprived of meaning in an ultimate sense.65  In short, those who aim to fulfill the biblical 
admonition to toil honestly66 find themselves at risk, without the support that makes risk 
meaningful, in a society that has masked necessity as freedom, and working for ends that are 
vacuous and without meaning.  It is given to us to ask if and how Luther’s treatment of crux et 
vocatio bear upon this situation in this strange new world. 
 The first step in reclaiming Luther’s treatment of crux et vocatio is to clarify his 
treatment of the public by distinguishing his phenomenology of the public, from his theology of 
the public.  Luther’s phenomenology of the public was relatively simple.  By virtue of creation, 
church and family were the two faces of the public in which humans were engaged.  Because of 
the fall, the threat of tribalism necessitated God’s inclusion of government as a way to provide 
order and safety for church and family.67  This three dimensioned public was formally stable in 
Luther’s estimation, although change was clearly a part of this description.  The prince might 
change, but the office of the prince was certain.  In Luther’s estimation, this three dimensioned 
public was ordered by God for the good of humans.  Of course, calling this a phenomenology 
is anachronistic, and Luther certainly considered his appraisal of the public to be defensible 
theologically.  Yet there is a distinction between this account of the public and his treatment of 
 
 65  Ivan Illich,  Tools for Convivality (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 40, 41. 
 66  Titus 3:14; 1 Thess. 4:11; Eph. 4:28. 
 67  Cf. LW-30, p. 74 where Luther asserts that ‘if there were no evil people, one would 
not need a government.’  Elsewhere, he designates all three estates as ‘ordained by God.’  Cf. 
LW-41, p. 177.  However, ‘ordination’ in this instance might refer to God’s action towards 
preservation in the absence of peace.  Cf. LW-13, p. 45. 
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the two reigns.  The treatment of two reigns is clearly of a piece with his Christology.68  This 
theology of the public serves to locate the place of the cross for the Christian in light of her 
relationship to Christ’s encounter with the world.  In fact, this theology of the public admits the 
possibility of a variety of descriptions of the public per se.  Luther’s theology of the public, 
however, is not necessarily discontinuous with phenomenologies of the public that differ from 
his own.  Luther’s theological description of world and church as a Christological correlate 
remain despite descriptions of the shape of the world that differ from his own three-fold 
phenomenology.  What is of importance, however, for our study is the affirmation that the 
church also has a vocation in the public.  While Luther intimated this point, Christian 
descriptions of the public today need to assert it.69  In the realm of the world, or public, the 
church itself has a vocation.70  The church, like its members, lives in both realms simultaneously 
and like its members, it has a vocation as a corporate body.71  At a fundamental level, such an 
affirmation responds to Arendt’s critique of the genesis of society in modernity.  Part of 
reclaiming the significance of vocation for the faithful in their work life, then, includes affirming 
the vocation of our public institutions.  In this sense, then, we go beyond Luther by way of 
Luther.  But what are we to do with Luther’s intransigent notion of Stände?  Can we square 
 
 68  LW-12, p. 26. 
 69  Cf. Luther’s insistence, as a theologian of the church, that the government establish a  
community chest for the welfare of the poor.  Cf. LW-45, pp. 159-194. 
 70  Despite Althaus’ assertion that the church has a vocation to preach to the world 
(Althaus, Die Ethik Martin Luthers, p. 152, 155), Luther generally used the term vocation in 
relationship to individuals. 
 71  Cf. Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, p. 77 where he refers to the church as a 
collective person. 
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Luther’s insistence that we cannot choose our own cross and the corollary assumption that the 
cross is concretized in our vocation with our modern experience of vocational uncertainty? 
 A way forward may be found in some comments Luther made regarding vocation in his 
exegesis of Psalm 147.  The passage warrants citation in full: 
 
 What else is all our work to God - whether in the fields, in the garden, in the city, in 
 the house, in way, or in government - but just such a child’s performance, by which He 
 want to give His gifts in the fields, at home, and everywhere else?  These are the masks 
 of God, behind which He wants to remain concealed and do all things.  Had Gideon  
 done nothing but take the field against Midian, the Midianites would not have been 
 beaten; and God could certainly have beaten them without Gideon.  He could give his 
 children without using men and women.  But He does not want to do this.  Instead, He 
 joins man and woman so that it appears to be the work of man and woman, and yet He 
 does it under the cover of such masks.  We have the saying: ‘God gives every good thing, 
 but not just by waving a wand.’  God gives all good gifts; but you must lend a hand and 
take the bull by the horn; that is, you must work and thus give God good cause and a 
mask.72 
 
 Two points deserve comment.  First, Luther underscores that God works through our 
working.  Humans are the means by which God does his own work.  Second, Luther underscores 
that it is given to us to work in earnest.  These two assertions are simultaneously affirmed by 
Luther and the seeming contradiction is not considered a problem for faith.  This treatment of 
 
 72  LW-14, pp. 114, 115. 
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vocation and grace is echoed in Bonhoeffer’s treatment of the penultimate and ultimate.  In the 
parlance of Bonhoeffer, vocation would be located in the sphere of the penultimate.  In 
discussing the relationship of the ultimate to the penultimate, Bonhoeffer contrasts the two 
extreme solution of radicalism and compromise.  The former arises from a hatred of what exists 
and so puts on a facade of pure spirituality while the latter arises from a hatred of the ultimate 
and exercises pure expediency.73 Bonhoeffer sees the penultimate and ultimate as united in 
Christ and their relationship is always finally for the sake of Christ: 
  
 From this follows now something of decisive importance, that the penultimate must be 
 preserved for the sake of the ultimate.  Arbitrary destruction of the penultimate seriously 
 harms the ultimate. ... Given this fact, in addition to proclaiming the ultimate word of  
 God - the justification of the sinner by grace alone - it is necessary to care for the  
  penultimate in order that the ultimate not be hindered by the penultimate’s destruction. 
 Those who proclaim the word yet do not do everything possible so that this word may 
 be heard are not true to the word’s claim for free passage, for a smooth road.  The way  
 for the word must be prepared.  The word itself demands it.74 
 
 Bonhoeffer presses the Christian to take seriously all that precedes the ultimate precisely 
because the penultimate is the cover for the ultimate: this is taught by the incarnation.75  This 
 
 73  Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 155, 156. 
 74  Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 160. 
 75  Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 158. 
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consequent affirmation of the means of our response - the mandates,76 or in the parlance of 
Luther, vocation - points us to the manner in which the gospel advances.  Christian life is 
participation in Christ’s encounter with the world.77   For Luther and Bonhoeffer both, then, the 
gospel first announces our passion in the event of salvation, but neither theologians stop at this 
point.  The gospel also propels us as agents.  God works through us in our working.  It is given to 
us to do something, but can this doing as responsio speak to the vocational shifts and the accent 
on self determination that mark modernity?  In speaking to this reality, we first need to address 
the givenness that persists in even the flux attending vocation today. 
 Despite modern protests to the contrary, agency as construed in modernity still occurs 
against the horizon of givenness.  However, it is precisely the character of this givenness that has 
changed in the context of the modern world.  In the premodern world, vocation was given in the 
mode of stability, whereas today it is often given in the mode of instability.  For moderns, not 
only the content, but the form of vocation is a cross.  Not only do family, work, et al place 
demands on me, but the very shifting of their shape does so as well.  This reflects the fact that in 
both form and content, there is quality of givenness that cannot be denied.  Does this mean that 
the faithful are simply to acquiesce in what for many has become the crisis of vocation?  Not 
insofar as we take seriously the vocational responsibility of the church within the public we have 
construed.  The church’s vocation is to work towards a vision of a just society which provides for 
 
 76  Bonhoeffer suggested that Christ’s relationship to the world is concretized by four 
mandates: work and culture, marriage, government and church.  He also notes that these 
mandates, as modes of vocation cannot be sources of free conscience insofar as their obligations 
are manifold and so demand compromise (Ethics, p. 292).  Consequently, not our Beruf, but the 
Ruf of Christ frees us (Ethics, p. 292).  All of this presupposes an understanding of Bonhoeffer’s 
distinction between the ultimate and the penultimate.  
 77  Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 159. 
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vocational stability while allowing for the possibility of vocational shift in response to God’s 
call.  In the interim, however, the crisis of vocation persists.  Yet God works even in this crisis.  
On the one hand, this crisis is one form of the cross used by God to shape the Christian.  On the 
other hand, this crisis is simultaneously the burden given to the church which can only be 
faithfully borne when the church calls it into question under the aegis of the gospel.  The 
condition for the possibility of doing this lay in a renewed vision of the church’s vocation in the 
public.  This vision, however, is attendant upon the narrative of the cross of Christ, the only font 
for a meaningful narration of the crosses borne by the faithful as witness to the possibility of 
hope. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A theology of the cross can run amiss in two ways.  On the one hand, it can be removed from the 
contingencies of life and be viewed as a general principle that makes sense of existential anxiety 
by scripting an internal struggle into the way of faith.  Too often, this anxiety itself is deemed the 
content of faith in abstraction from the narrative of incarnation, cross, resurrection and ascension.  
On the other hand, even while attending to the concreteness of suffering, an earnest, yet 
misleading theology of the cross will posit the faulty assertion that suffering per se is the locus of 
revelation.  This claim presumes that God can be located in abstraction from Word and 
Sacrament wherein the risen Christ is present.  In this article I have proposed that a faithful 
apprehension of Luther’s treatment of the cross demands that it first be seen as a concrete event 
in the incarnate Lord, who forms us by the cross concretized in vocation.  While affirming the 
usefulness of Luther’s treatment of vocation, I have also suggested that certain aspects of his 
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treatment of the public and his expression of the intransigence of our vocation need to be revised 
in light of current realities.  In do doing, I have proposed that the notion of vocation be applied to 
the church itself as a corporate partner in the public sphere and have suggested that ecclesial 
vocation is integral to our task of reclaiming Luther’s assertion of human agency in vocation, 
that means by which we bear the cross that bears us. 
